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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)Q).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
None.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
The following material facts are undisputed:
1.

Mr. Anderson began employment with the Larry H. Miller

Communications Corporation (the "Company") in November of 2007 as one of
three anchors of a morning television show called "KJZZ Cafe" to be broadcast on
the Company's KJZZ television station. R. 86-88.
2.

At the time he was hired, Mr. Anderson was a full-time school teacher

in the Davis County School District. R. 91-93.
3.

Mr. Anderson is highly educated, with a Masters Degree in English.

R. 109.
4.

In approximately the summer/fall of 2007, Dean Paynter, the

Company's Director of News and Program Development at the time, invited
Mr. Anderson to audition for one of the three co-anchor positions for the new
morning show. R. 85-92.

1
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5.

After the auditions, Mr. Paynter recommended to his supervisor,

Chris Baum, that Mr. Anderson as well as Andy Waits and Tracy Woolley be hired
as the three anchors for the new show. R. 87-92.
6.

Chris Baum was the General Manager of the Company during the

time Mr. Anderson was employed. R. 178 (p. 18: 15-19).
7.

Mr. Paynter did not have the authority to hire Mr. Anderson or the

other two anchors. Mr. Anderson was aware of this, and knew that someone other
than Mr. Paynter would make the hiring decision. R. 87-89, 91-92.
8.

Mr. Anderson began working for the Company on November 26,

2007. R. 3,119.
9.

On November 28, 2007, Mr. Anderson signed a number of personnel

documents, including an Employment Application, Employee Handbook and
Employment At-Will Acknowledgement. R. 96-102.
10.

(

The Application Mr. Anderson signed states as follows, in all capital

letters, directly above the signature line:
I

IF EMPLOYED, I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT MY
EMPLOYMENT IS "AT-WILL" AND MAY BE TERMINATED
WITH OR WITHOUT CAUSE OR NOTICE, AT MY OPTION OR
THE OPTION OF THE EMPLOYER.
4

R. 97-98; Application at R. 117-118.
11.

That same day, Mr. Anderson signed another document
i

acknowledging that he received, read and understood the Company's Employee
2
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i

Handbook, and that he understood that he was an employee at-will, and as such
had no guaranteed period of employment. R. 100-102; Acknowledgement of
Employee Handbook and "AT-WILL" Employment, R. 120 (Ex. 1 to Appellee's
Addendum attached hereto).
12.

The Acknowledgement states, in part, as follows:

I understand that my employment is "at-will." I understand that I may
quit for any reason or no reason at all and that my employment may
be terminated at any time with or without cause or notice.
R. 100-102, 120 (Ex. 1 to Appellee's Addendum attached hereto).
13.

The Acknowledgement also states as follows:

I also understand and agree that no person other than Larry H. Miller
has the authority to enter into any binding commitment or agreement
to or with me, on behalf of the Company, and that any such
commitment or agreement must be in writing and signed by all
parties.
R. 101-102, 120 (Ex. 1 to Appellee's Addendum attached hereto (emphasis
added)).
14.

The Employee Handbook Mr. Anderson acknowledged that he

received and understood has a provision which states as follows:
This handbook is not intended to create any contractual obligation
between the Larry H. Miller Group of Companies and its employees.
The Larry H. Miller Group of Companies is an "at-will" employer.
Employees may quit for any reason or no reason at all, or they may be
terminated by the company at any time with or without cause or
notice.
3
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R. 105-106, 123.
15.

Mr. Anderson signed yet another confirmation of his at-will status two

days later, on November 30, 2007. R. 99-100; Acknowledgement of Drug Testing
Policy, R. 125, which states, in part, as follows:
I further acknowledge that I am an "at-will" employee of the Group,
and that nothing in the Drug Testing Policy alters the Group's right to
terminate me at-will, with or without cause.
16.

Mr. Anderson had no written signed employment agreement at the

time he signed the at-will and commitment disclaimer documents. R. 95, 98-99.
17.

On December 26, 2007, Mr. Paynter requested the Company's legal

department to provide him with a draft employment agreement that he could
distribute to the three anchors for discussion purposes. R. 129-130, 134-135.
18.

On January 3, 2008, the Company's legal department provided

)

Mr. Paynter with the requested draft of a potential employment agreement.
R. 128-130.
I

19.

Mr. Paynter distributed the draft to all three anchors on or about

January 4, 2008. R. 128-129. A copy of the draft provided to Mr. Anderson is
Appellee's Exhibit 2 to the Appellee's Addendum attached hereto, and in the
record at R. 137-144.
\
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1

20.

The draft contained a number of blanks, including a number of blanks

in the paragraph defining the term of the agreement, and the dates by which the
Company could choose to renew or reject the contract on an annual basis. R. 137144 (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum,ffl[2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, and 4.1).
21.

Paragraph 2.1 of the draft agreement also contained a parenthetical

question for ongoing discussion purposes which states as follows:
[IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE WE OUGHT TO SPECIFY?]
R. 137 (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, ^ 2.1).
22.

The draft employment agreement was never signed by Mr. Anderson,

Larry Miller, or anyone else. R. 95, 98-99.
23.

At no time did Mr. Anderson or Larry Miller, or anyone else, sign any

document guaranteeing Mr. Anderson three years of employment, or salary in the
event he was discharged prior to the end of the alleged three year term. R. 95, 9899.
24.

Mr. Anderson claims that when he received the draft employment

agreement from Dean Paynter, Mr. Paynter told him that the agreement did not
need to be signed to be valid. R. 109-1 ll. 1

1

Mr. Paynter strongly denies making any such statement or that he made any
contractual commitments to Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson's assertions to the
contrary are accepted as true for purposes of summary judgment only.
5
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25.

The first KJZZ Cafe show aired on January 21, 2008; the following

day, the show received very negative reviews. R. 103-104.
26.

The show continued to receive bad reviews and low ratings and was

therefore cancelled approximately 10 months later, in November 2008. R. 84, 103,
107-108, 131-132.
27.

As a result of the show's cancellation, Mr. Anderson and about 30 of

the Company's other employees associated with the show were laid off. R. 131133.
28.

At no time did Mr. Anderson quit his teaching job with the Davis

County School District. In fact, while employed by the Company, he continued to
teach full-time until some time in January 2008, and then only reduced his hours
by one-third thereafter. R. 84, 94, 106, 112-113.
29.

Mr. Anderson resumed full-time teaching in August 2009, and has

{

worked full-time teaching for the Davis County School District since then. R. 7778,80.
i

RESPONSE TO MR, ANDERSON'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
As shown below, the assertions made in paragraphs 11, 27 and 30 of
Mr. Anderson's Statement of Facts are incorrect, not supported by the cited
testimony, and in some cases contradicts the cited testimony. These paragraphs are
restated below, followed by Defendant's responses to each:

^

6
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1

11.

Mr. Paynter selected Mr. Anderson and two others to become the

anchors for KJZZ Cafe. R. 87-88.
Response:

This statement is misleading and inaccurate, because it leaves

out the fact that Mr. Anderson knew that Mr. Paynter had no authority to hire him
or the other anchors and that others would be making the decision:
A. (Mr. Anderson) Well, for Dean it was already decided that we were
the three, but he was trying to convince other people.
Q. (Ms. Smith) Right. But you knew that Dean didn't have the final
decision as to who the three would be, isn't that correct?
A. (Mr. Anderson) Yes.
Q. (Ms. Smith) So you knew that even though Dean Paynter wanted
the three of you, that someone else would be making the final
decision?
A. (Mr. Anderson) Yes.
R.91.
27.

On or about January 4, 2008, Mr. Paynter presented Mr. Anderson

with the Employment Agreement at issue in this case, which contained a salary
guarantee for three years. R. 183-184; Employment Agreement at R. 137-144.
Mr. Paynter acknowledges that he gave Mr. Anderson a contract that represented
what LHMCC was prepared to offer him. R. 192. When Mr. Anderson did not get
back to him with any changes, he understood that Mr. Anderson did not have any
major objections to the contract.
7
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Response:

Contrary to Mr. Anderson's assertion, the draft employment

agreement does not contain a salary guarantee for three years. In fact, the term of
the Agreement is left blank. R. 138 (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, ]f 3).
The assertion that "Mr. Paynter acknowledges that he gave Mr. Anderson a
contract that represented what LHMCC was prepared to offer him" is contradicted
by the testimony Mr. Anderson cites in support of this assertion. In fact, Mr.
Paynter testified that the agreement was only "a draft for them to see what the
company had initially offered" and that:
We would have scrutinized it further before — it seems to me we
would have scrutinized it further before putting it in concrete.
R. 192 (p. 108: 14-16).
Mr. Paynter further testified that a critical term was missing as evidenced by
the blank lines in the draft, which would have been filled in had the draft been
"scrutinized further."
And, in fact, would have picked up on something that was — had
been missing, and that is the one year out for both sides, after each
year, which was not included in the draft. Which both Chris and I
discussed.
Q. (Ms. Hollingsworth) What do you mean "one year out?"
A. (Mr. Paynter) As I discussed, after one year, both sides would have
the chance to opt-out, with some notice.
Q. (Ms. Hollingsworth) And that was missing from the contract?
A. (Mr. Paynter) Yes.
8
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R. 192-93 (pp. 108: 17-25; 109: 1-2).
The assertion that "when Mr. Anderson did not get back to him with any
changes, [Mr. Paynter] understood that Mr. Anderson did not have any major
objections to the contract" is misleading, because it leaves out Mr. Paynter's
testimony that:
I expect — I expected them to look at it, and give me any feedback on
the draft before we would have put it in - in concrete.
R. 192 (p. 106: 15-17).
This was a draft. It was very clear in my mind this was a draft. My —
my extension to these three people was this is a draft. Take a look at
it. Get feedback for it before we put the draft into a final form.
R. 134.
30.

Mr. Paynter claims that the Employment Agreement was only a draft,

but as stated above, he does not dispute that the terms in it represented his
Agreement with Mr. Anderson. He claims that the reason it was never finalized
was due to the fact that the parties were busy: my recollection is that we were in
the heat of battle . . . we were moving forward on the show . . . we were more
worried about what we were doing on the air then where the contracts were."
R. 134-135.
Response:

Mr. Paynter never testified "that the terms in [the draft

employment agreement] represented his agreement with Mr. Anderson." In fact,
9
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as shown in the above quoted testimony, Mr. Paynter expressly denied that he had
any agreement with Mr. Anderson. Mr. Paynter testified that the Employment
Agreement given to the anchors was only a draft with terms left to be negotiated
and filled in and never became a final agreement. R. 134-135, 192-193 (pp. 106109).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Anderson's claims are based upon his assertion that he had a guaranteed
contract of employment with the Company for three years, and that he is entitled to
be paid his salary for the two years he claims was remaining on his contract after
he was let go pursuant to a reduction in force. This Court should affirm the trial
court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all of Mr. Anderson's claims for the
following reasons:
Mr. Anderson's claim for breach of contract fails as a matter of law because

(

it is undisputed that 1) the person he claims committed to the alleged contract on
behalf of the Company, Dean Paynter, had no authority to do so; 2) the only person
who had the authority to bind the Company to any such commitment or agreement
was Larry Miller, and Mr. Miller never made any promises or representations to
I

Mr. Anderson; 3) any such commitment or agreement by Mr. Miller could only
legally bind the Company if it were in a writing signed by all parties, and there is
i
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i

no such writing; and 4) the unsigned draft agreement Mr. Anderson seeks to
enforce is not complete and too indefinite to constitute a contract.
Mr. Anderson's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing fails as a matter of law because the covenant only applies to existing,
established contract terms, does not create new independent rights not agreed upon
by the parties, and the undisputed facts established that the contract Mr. Anderson
alleges never existed.
Mr. Anderson's claims for promissory estoppel and fraud fail as a matter of
law because 1) the Company as an entity never made any promise or other
representation to Mr. Anderson; and 2) since he knew that Dean Paynter had no
authority to bind the Company, and that nothing but a writing signed by all parties
was enforceable, Mr. Anderson did not reasonably rely on any verbal
representations made by Dean Paynter.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. ANDERSON'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT FAILS
AS A MATTER OF LAW.
A.

Dean Paynter Did Not Have the Authority to Bind the Company
to the Contract Mr. Anderson Seeks to Enforce.

Mr. Anderson's claim that Dean Paynter guaranteed his salary for three
years fails because the undisputed facts establish that Mr. Paynter had neither
actual nor apparent authority to bind the Company to any such promise.
11
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1.

Dean Paynter Did Not Have Actual Authority to Bind the
Company.

Mr. Anderson expressly agreed at the beginning of his employment in
November 2007, that "no person other than Larry H. Miller has the authority to
enter into any binding commitment or agreement to or with me, on behalf of the
Company, and that any such commitment or agreement must be in writing and
signed by all parties." Mr. Anderson's express acknowledgement and agreement
that only Larry H. Miller could contractually bind the Company to any
commitment or agreement bars Mr. Anderson's contractual claim as a matter of

'

law. See, e ^ Rolsen V. Lazarus, Inc., 2000 WL 1434170* 4-5 (Ohio App. 1
Dist, Sept. 29, 2000) (where company informed employee that only the Senior
Vice President of Human Resources had the authority to bind the company to an
employment agreement and that any such agreement had to be in writing and
signed by that person, employee's contract claim based on verbal representations
by another employee failed as a matter of law) (attached hereto as Ex. 3 to
Appellee's Addendum); Waterman v. Greektown Casino, 2004 WL 787157 *2

1

(Mich. App. April 13, 2004) (same) (attached hereto as Ex. 4 to Appellee's
Addendum); Kaplan v. Capital Company of America, LLC, 298 A.D. 2d 110, 111
(App. Div. N.Y.) (plaintiffs breach of contract claim failed as a matter of law,
because given the contractual disclaimer, the company officers who made the
i
alleged contractual promises to plaintiff had no actual or apparent authority to bind
12
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4

the company), Tomlinson v. Qualcomm, Inc., 118 Cal Rptr. 2d 822, 831 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) ("Here, the parties agreed to both the at-will relationship and to the
exclusive method for amending the at-will nature of [plaintiffs] employment, and
therefore no other purported amendments (whether in written or oral form) are
effective.59)-2
Mr. Anderson's assertion that the Court may consider extrinsic evidence of
intent beyond the clear and unambiguous language of a signed agreement is
incorrect. Utah law is clear that extrinsic evidence may not be considered to
determine the intent of the parties if the language of the agreement is
unambiguous. Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, L L C , 207 P.3d 1235
(Utah 2009):
Where the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, the party's intentions are determined from the plain
meaning of the contractual language and the contract may be
interpreted as a matter of law. Only if the language of the contract is
ambiguous will we consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent.
Cafe Rio at 1240. See also, Daines v. Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269 (Utah 2008).3

There is no support for Mr. Anderson's assertion that the draft employment
agreement he was provided in January 2008 "superseded" the Acknowledgment he
signed.
3

The Utah Court of Appeals case of Gillmor v. Macev, 2005 UT App. 351 (Utah
App. 2005) relied upon by Mr. Anderson in support of his claim that extrinsic
evidence should be considered in this matter pre-dated Daines. The Utah Supreme
Court's holdings in Daines and the subsequent Cafe Rio case is the law, not
Gillmor.
13
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that "before permitting recourse to parol
evidence a court must make a determination of facial ambiguity." Daines at 1276.
Facial ambiguity does not exist unless the plaintiff first offers a reasonable
competing interpretation of the language at issue. Id. Further, "[a] finding of
ambiguity [is justified] only if the competing interpretations are reasonably
supported by the language of the contract." Moss v. Parr Waddoups, 197 P.3d 659,
663 (Utah App. 2008). "There can be no ambiguity where evidence is offered to
obscure otherwise plain contractual terms" and the Supreme Court does "not intend
i

that a judge allow surrounding circumstances to create ambiguity where the
language of a contract would otherwise not permit." Daines at 1277. Absent a
finding of facial ambiguity, "the parties intentions must be determined solely from
the language of the contract." Daines at 1279.
Mr. Anderson's assertion that an ambiguity was created by the Company's

{

Employee Handbook because it states that the General Manager (Chris Baum)
could bind the Company to agreements concerning employment is unavailing
1

because 1) this is an impermissible attempt to use extrinsic evidence to obscure the
unambiguous language of the Acknowledgement he signed, and to which he
expressly agreed; 2) Mr. Anderson admits that Mr. Baum did not enter into any
agreement with him and this language does not create any issue of fact concerning
whether Mr. Paynter had any such authority; 3) the Acknowledgment

I
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l

Mr. Anderson signed states that the handbook is not a contract, not legally binding,
and the Company retained the right "to depart from those policies and guidelines or
change them at its sole discretion;" and 4) the handbook provision has the same
signed writing requirement as the Acknowledgement Mr. Anderson signed, which
Mr. Anderson admits was not met.
There is no ambiguity in the express statement Mr. Anderson signed, and
Mr. Anderson does not offer any alternative or "competing" interpretation of the
meaning of the Acknowledgement which would in any way support his assertion
that Dean Paynter had the authority to bind the Company to the commitment he
asserts in this action. For this reason, the Court should enforce the
Acknowledgement's clear and unequivocal language to which Mr. Anderson
expressly agreed.
2.

Dean Paynter Did Not Have Apparent Authority to Bind
the Company.

Mr. Anderson asserts that apparent authority of an agent to bind its principal
exists "where a person has created such an appearance of things that it causes a
third party reasonably and prudently to believe that a second party has the power to
act on behalf of the first person." However, it is undisputed that the Company
expressly informed Mr. Anderson that only Mr. Miller had the authority to bind the
Company to an employment contract, thereby making it clear that Mr. Paynter had
no authority to do so, apparent or otherwise.
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Contrary to Mr. Anderson's assertion, the case of Shattuck-Owen v.
Snowbird Corporation, 16 P.3d 555, 560 (Utah 2000) does not stand for the
proposition that a representative who holds himself out as someone who can bind
the Company, has the authority to do so despite a written statement to the contrary.
In Shattuck-Owen, the court noted that the contract disclaimer in the employee
handbook at issue there was limited, because it stated only that no one but the CEO
had the authority to "alter the at-will relationship." (Emphasis added.) Unlike
here, that disclaimer contained no disclaimer of general contractual liability. The
Shattuck-Owen court simply held that any promise made by the V.P. of Human
Resources to reimburse an employee for the cost of therapy with her doctor could
be enforced, because the handbook disclaimer did not apply to that type of
promise:
On its face, the statement simply provides that the CEO/Chairman is
the only person who can modify the at-will employment status of the
signee, and that the modification must be in writing. In the instant
case, Shattuck-Owen's alleged contract does not deal with her at-will
employment status. As such, the signed statement appears to have no
application to the instant case, at least in light of the facts currently on
the record.

<

'

Shattuck-Owen at 560.
Here, the contract disclaimer is not limited, as was the contract disclaimer in

*

Shattuck-Owen. Unlike the Shattuck-Owen disclaimer, this disclaimer expressly
states that no one other than Larry H. Miller had the authority to bind the Company
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to any agreement or other commitment, and then only in a writing signed by all
parties. Because these clear, unambiguous conditions were not met, summary
judgment should be affirmed.
It is undisputed given the clear contractual disclaimer to which
Mr. Anderson expressly agreed that Dean Paynter had no authority to bind the
Company to a three year guaranteed employment contract with Mr. Anderson, or
make any other binding commitment on behalf of the Company, and that
Mr. Anderson knew this to be true. It is further undisputed that Larry Miller never
entered into any such contract with Mr. Anderson or otherwise made any
representations or promises to Mr. Anderson.4 Therefore, any alleged "promises"
or "representations" made by Mr. Paynter concerning a guaranteed three year
contract or any other alleged commitments are not binding on the Company and
are unenforceable.
B.

There Was no Contract as a Matter of Law Because the Company
Clearly Intended That There Would be no Contract Unless in
Writing and Signed by All Parties.

Utah law states that "if the parties make it clear that they do not intend that
there should be legal consequences unless and until a formal writing is executed,
there is no contract until that time." Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place Assoc,
622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980); see also R J . Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d
4

It is also undisputed that Mr. Anderson never talked to the General Manager,
Chris Baum, about his alleged contract. R. 113-114.
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817, 820 (Utah 1952) (explaining that "if an intention is manifested in any way that
legal obligations between the parties shall be deferred until the writing is made, the
preliminary negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract."); Precision
Time, Inc. v. Equity Properties and Development Limited Partnership, 2001 WL
1297792 (Utah App. October 25, 2001) (a tentative agreement on a number of
relevant terms is unenforceable and does not constitute a binding contract where
one of the parties expressed its intent not be bound other than by a finalized, signed
contract) (attached hereto as Ex. 5 to Appellee's Addendum).
Mr. Anderson's assertion that Mr. Paynter told him that the draft agreement
did not need to be signed is irrelevant, because, as established above, only Larry
Miller had the authority to commit the Company to any modification of the express
signature requirement Mr. Anderson agreed to when he began employment.
Furthermore, given the express disclaimer language Mr. Anderson signed, any

<

such modification of the signature requirement had to be in writing and signed by
all parties as well.
I
Because it is undisputed that 1) the Company intended not to be bound to
any commitment or agreement other than a written contract signed by all parties,
and 2) no such signed contract exists, Mr. Anderson's claim for breach of contract
for a guaranteed three year term of employment and three years of salary fails as a
matter of law.

I
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4

C.

The Draft Agreement Mr. Anderson Seeks to Enforce is
Unenforceable Because it is Incomplete and Indefinite.

The draft employment agreement Mr. Anderson seeks to enforce is not a
complete agreement, but contains a number of blanks leaving essential terms to be
filled in which were never finalized, including the term of the agreement. See
Draft Employment Agreement (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, R. 137-144). The
agreement also contains comments in a parenthetical phrase which further
establishes that it was a draft only for discussion purposes and was not finalized.
See Draft Employment Agreement (Ex. 2 to Appellee's Addendum, R. 137-144,

112.1).
Under Utah law "It is fundamental that a meeting of the minds on the
integral features of an agreement is essential to the formation of a contract. An
agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite." Nielsen v. Golds Gym,
78 P.3d 600, 602 (Utah 2003), quoting Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d
368, 373 (Utah 1996); see also Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah
1926) ("So long as there is any uncertainty or indefmiteness, or future negotiations
or considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a completed contract.
In fact, there is no contract at all.")
Essential terms were missing from the draft agreement, and as Mr. Paynter
testified, the Company never meant for it to be the final agreement, but only
something to be discussed and perhaps agreed to later. See R. 134-135, 234-235.
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As such, it is not enforceable. See, e.g., Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639
(Utah 1979) ("such agreements to agree are generally unenforceable because they
leave open material terms for future consideration, and the courts cannot create
these terms for the parties"). Further, Mr. Anderson ignores the settled Utah law
discussed above which holds that if a party expresses its intent not to be bound
except by a signed writing, there is no contract until that is accomplished.
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Anderson's First Cause of Action for Breach
of Contract fails as a matter of law and the grant of summary judgment dismissing
this claim should be affirmed.
II.

MR. ANDERSON'S SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE COMPANY FAILS AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Mr. Anderson's claim that the Company should be estopped from denying

that he had a guaranteed contract for three years fails because 1) given the contract

\

disclaimer he signed, the Company could not be bound by any representation of a
three year employment contract or guaranteed salary by Mr. Paynter, and
i
2) Mr. Anderson could not have reasonably relied upon any representation to this
effect made by Mr. Paynter.
In order to establish a claim for promissory estoppel, Mr. Anderson must
establish each of the following elements:
i
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1.

He acted with prudence and in reasonable reliance on a promise made

by the Company.
2.

The Company knew that Mr. Anderson had relied on the promise

which it reasonably expected would induce action or forbearance on the part of
Mr. Anderson;
3.

The Company was aware of all material facts; and

4.

Mr. Anderson relied on the Company's promise and the reliance

resulted in a loss to Mr. Anderson.
See Nunley v. Westates Casing Services, Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999).
Mr. Anderson's assertion that Utah case law is clear 'that a determination
regarding reasonable reliance is not appropriate for summary judgment" is
incorrect. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "while the question of reasonable
reliance is usually a matter within the province of a jury, there are instances where
courts may conclude that as a matter of law, there was no reasonable reliance."
Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1067, Utah 1996 (citations
omitted). One such instance is where, as here, the plaintiff argues that he
reasonably relied upon oral statements in light of contrary written information.
Gold Standard at 1068. In fact, Gold Standard held that under well-settled Utah
law, "a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by the opposing party in
light of contrary written information." Id.
21
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Mr. Anderson was well aware that Mr. Paynter had no authority to bind the
Company to a promise of a guaranteed salary for three years, and that no such
promise was enforceable or binding upon the Company unless it was made in a
writing signed by both him and Larry Miller. See, e.g., Rolsen, supra, *6, where in
addressing the same sort of contract disclaimer at issue here, the Court held as
follows:
The fallacy of [plaintiff s promissory estoppel] argument is
several-fold. First, according to the express terms of her
employment, only the Senior Vice President in charge of Human
Resources could alter the terms of Rolsen's at-will employment.
In fact, the express terms specifically stated that a manager-level
employee did not have the authority to enter into a contract for
extended employment. Thus, even if we assume that Meier had
made a promise of continued employment, Rolsen's reliance upon
it would not have been reasonable, since she was expected to have
read and understood the language in her employment application.
See also Honorable v. American Wyott Corp., 11 P.3d 928, 931 (Wyo. 2000)
(promissory estoppel claim failed as a matter of law where employee's contract
disclaimer stated that no supervisor or manager has the authority to bind the
company to any employment contract, and that any employment contract had to be

|

in writing and signed by one of the named individuals.).
Because the Company as an entity never made any promise of guaranteed
<

employment to Mr. Anderson and because he knew that Mr. Paynter had no
authority to make any such promise on behalf of the Company and therefore did

22
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not reasonably rely upon any such promise, the grant of summary judgment
dismissing Mr. Anderson's claim for promissory estoppel should be affirmed.
III.

MR. ANDERSON'S THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR FRAUD
AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Mr. Anderson's claim for fraud against the Company and Mr. Paynter5 also

fails because 1) the Company as an entity never made any of the alleged
representations to Mr. Anderson; and 2) Mr. Anderson did not reasonably rely
upon the alleged verbal representations by Mr. Paynter.
In order to establish a claim of fraud under Utah law, Mr. Anderson must
prove each of the following elements:
1) a representation was made; 2) concerning a presently existing
material fact; 3) which was false; and 4) which the representor a)
knew to be false or b) made recklessly knowing that there was
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation; 5)
for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it and 6) the
other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 7) did in
fact rely upon it; 8) and was thereby induced to act 9) to that party's
injury and damage.
See Gold Standard at 1066-67.
As discussed above, Mr. Anderson could not have reasonably relied upon
Paynter5 s alleged verbal promise of a three year guaranteed contract or three years
guaranteed salary, in light of the clear agreement he signed which provided that he

5

Mr. Anderson acknowledges that he has no estoppel or fraud claim against Chris
Baum, inasmuch as he testified that he never talked to Mr. Baum about his alleged
contract. R. 113-114.
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was an employee at-will, and that the only person who had the authority to modify
the at-will status or make any other binding commitments or agreements on behalf
of the Company was Larry Miller, and that the only way any agreement would be
binding was if it was in writing, signed by both parties. In light of Mr. Anderson's
signed acknowledgement and express agreement to these terms, he could not, and
did not, reasonably rely upon the alleged verbal representations of Mr. Paynter.
Mr. Anderson also did not reasonably rely upon Mr. Paynter's alleged
representation that the draft agreement he received did not need to be signed to be
valid, in light of the clear contractual disclaimer he signed which provided that
only Larry Miller could make binding commitments on behalf of the Company,
and only then in a signed writing, which includes any modification of the express

i

signature requirement.
Finally, Mr. Anderson's claim for fraud against the Company also fails

|

because the Company as an entity never made any such representation to
Mr. Anderson. Only Larry Miller had the authority to commit the Company, and
Mr. Anderson knew this.
For these reasons, the grant of summary judgment dismissing
Mr. Anderson's claims for fraud should be affirmed.

I
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IV.

MR. ANDERSON'S FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR BREACH
OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Mr. Anderson's alleged claims for breach of implied covenant of good faith

and fair dealing against Defendants for "making promises to Mr. Anderson
regarding a salary guarantee for three years that they did not intend to be bound
by" fails because there was no such contract in the first place.
Utah law is clear that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
only applies to established, existing contract terms, and cannot create "new,
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties." Brehany v.
Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991).
In order for the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to apply,
there must be a contract term which creates an obligation on the part of the obligor,
which in turn contains an implied covenant that the obligor will act in good faith in
meeting its contractual obligation. There is no implied covenant of good faith
which applies to a generic "employment relationship" with no reference to any
specific contractual obligation on the part of the employer and Mr. Anderson has
cited no authority which supports this assertion.
Here, the only contractual obligation Mr. Anderson asserts is the alleged
obligation to pay him two years of salary, which is the amount of time he claims
remained on his "Term" of the alleged employment agreement after his discharge.
25
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Because there was no such contract, there is no such obligation which the
Company was required to carryout in good faith. Brehanv at 55.
V.

THE LACK OF A HEARING ON THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT DOES NOT WARRANT REVERSAL.
As Mr. Anderson acknowledges, failure to hold a hearing after a party

requests it does not compel reversal of the trial court's substantive ruling unless it
is prejudicial.6
In the case relied upon by Mr. Anderson, Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251
(Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court refused to reverse the trial court's
substantive ruling based upon its failure to hold a hearing. In doing so, the court
held:
For such error to compel reversal of the trial court's substantive
ruling, however, it must have been prejudicial. If the error was
harmless, that is, if the error was sufficiently inconsequential that
there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected the outcome of the
case, then a reversal is not in order.
Price at 1255 (citations omitted).
The Price court went on to hold that the plaintiff had failed to show
prejudice sufficient to warrant reversal because:

Further, Appellees do not concede that the trial court erred in not scheduling or
holding a hearing. A court is not required to grant a request for a hearing if it finds
that the relevant issues have been authoritatively decided. See Utah R. Civ. P.
7(e). The Minute Entry issued by the court granting summary judgment indicates
that it believed the issues to have been authoritatively decided by "clear" contract
law. R. 239-242.

(
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He has not shown that he would have made new or additional
arguments at the hearing that were not covered by his memorandum
of points and authorities. Indeed, on appeal to this court the
arguments made by Price in his appellate brief and during oral
argument are the same arguments that he made in his memorandum
before the trial court.
IcL See also West v. Case, 142 P.3d 576, 580 (Ut. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the
trial court's failure to hold a hearing was harmless error because the defendant did
not identify any reason to believe that oral argument would have altered the trial
court's ruling.).
Mr. Anderson does not claim to have been deprived the opportunity to make
new arguments which had a reasonable likelihood of altering the trial court's
ruling. Instead, he claims only that he "could have pointed out the factual issues
and legal precedent that the court was overlooking in analyzing the case as set
forth herein." However, there is no evidence that the court "overlooked" anything,
and Mr. Anderson's arguments and legal precedent contained in his brief before
this Court are the same arguments and legal precedent contained in his
memorandum to the trial court.
Because Mr. Anderson has failed to establish that he had any new arguments
which if made at the hearing had a reasonable likelihood of altering the outcome of
the case, any error in not holding a hearing was harmless and reversal is not
warranted. Price at 1255; West at 580.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the decision of the trial
court granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissing
Plaintiffs entire action, with prejudice.
DATED this 19th day of July, 2011.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Janet Hugie Smith
Michael E. Blue
Attorneys for Appellees Larry H. Miller
Communications Corporation, Dean
Paynter and Chris Baum
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 19,2011, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES were served upon the following by United
States Mail:
April L. Hollingsworth
Hollingsworth Law Office
1115 South 900 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105R
Attorney for Appellant
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801-238-5421

KJZZ VJ ACCTG

PAGE

Acknowledgment of
Employee Handbook and "At-Will" Employment
] have received a copy oHhe Employe* Handbook and 1 understand iln cement*. I understand
that Ihc handbook is intended to provide an uverviitw of the Company's personnel policies and
procedures and does nol necessarily represent a)! such policies or procedures I also understand
lhaf (he Company's personnel policies are guidelines and not legally binding on rely employe
and thai Lhe Comply reserves the right ID depart from those policies and guidelines or change
them at itt sole discretion.
J understand ih&t my employment is "al wilt." 1 u&d&rsUnd that! may quit lor jriy reason
or no reason at fclUrtd thai my employment may be terminated al any lirat with or without
cause or notice.
I also understand that the Company's policies that iruy be set forth Irt the handbook concerning
procedures connected with any disciplinary action art guidelines and not legally binding on the
Larry H, Miller Group of Companies. The Comply s e r v e s the right to depart fronl those
policies and guidelines or change them al its sole discretion. 1 also understand arid agree thai no
person other than Larry H. MUler his the authority to enter into any binding cominitmfcrtt QXr .
agreement to or with ma, on behaJF or the Company, and that &jiy such conunllmenl or agreement
must be in writing and signed by BIJ pstriies
FlnaJOy, I understand thai my acceptance ofthe$e terms and conditions 16 acknowledged by my
continued employment whether or not 1 elect to execute ihis'acknowledgment.

Employee Name (Fteasa Prioi)t
Employee Signature

p«t«

. <^0fiv%*s$/ ^i^^r^iE^\J

Tffj&Ur

Location./Company:

K J~Z^ ~Z-—~
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT
This Agreement is entered into as of die 26di day of November, 2007, by and between
LARRY H. MILLER COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, a Utah corporation dba KJZZTV ("LHMCC") and STEVE ANDERSON ("Anderson"). LHMCC and Anderson will
individually be referred lo as a 'Tarty" and will collectively be referred to as die "Parties". '
WITNESSETH:

'

WHEREAS, LHMCC is die owner rind operator of that certain independent U H F
Channel 14 television station in die Salt Lake City DMA ("KJZZ-TV''); and
WHEREAS, Anderson is qualified to act as a news anchorperson; and
WHEREAS, LHMCC desires to procure and Anderson desires to provide Anderson's
sendees as set forth herein;
N O W , THEREFORE, in consideration of die mutual promises and covenants contained
herein, die parties hereto agree as follows:
1.
Employment LHMCC hereby engages Anderson to render his sendees as set forth
herein to LHMCC during die Term of this. Agreement (as hereinafter defined). Anderson hereby
accepts such employment and undertalces to perform all of die duties and obligations assumed by
him hereunder.
2.

Duties and Sendees.
2.1

During die Term hereof, Anderson shall have die following responsibilities:

•a.
Act as television news anchor for die morning news program on
KJZZ-TV. It is contemplated die said morning news program will be broadcast five (5) days each
week (each weekday) from _ _ a.m. lo
a.m.;
b.
Perform such odier duties as IJHQMCC may reasonably direct in
connection with die foregoing.

p\TH^
2.2
Anderson shall personally attend up to
( ) public relations and
odier KJZZrTV functions each year during die Term, at die discretion of LHMCC and witii
reasonable notice. Anderson agrees to be present for die entire duration of any such functions.
Anderson shall also appeal* in and/or voice various commercials, as reasonably specified by
LHMCC, to promote KJZZ/TV.
2.3

During die Term, Anderson shall be die exclusive property of LHMCC in
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die Salt Lake City Television DMA, and shall render his television and commercial advertising
sendees solely and exclusively for LHMCC, except as set forth otherwise herein. Ajiderson shall
clear all public, media and commercial appearances and endorsements with LHMCC prior to
entering into any agreement witii regard to such appearances. LHMCC may, in LHMCC's sole
discretion, approve or deny Anderson's request related to an}' such appearance.
• 2.4
Anderson shall not, during the T e n n hereof, grant to any diird party die
right to use liis name, voice or likeness for broadcasting, commercial or advertising purposes
witiiouL die widen consent of LHMCC. Consent shall be granted whenever die broadcast,
commercial or advertisement is not inconsistent with, the best interests of LHMCC, LHMCC's
sponsors and advertisers. LHMCC shall be die sole judge of what is or is not in LHMCC's best*
interests or die best interests of LHMCC's sponsors and advertisers.
3.

Tenn.

3.1
The term of tiiis Agreement (die "Term") shall commence at 12:01 a.m. on
November 26, 2007, and shall end at midnight on
, 2010 unless sooner terminated
as provided herein. Provided, LHMCC shall have die option to renew diis Agreement for two
additional terms (each a "Renewal Term") of one (1) year each (
, 2010 tiirough
, 2011; and
, 2011 through
, 2012). Each such option
shall be exercised by "written notice to Anderson at least ninety (90) days prior to die expiration of
die dien current Term (or Renewal Term).
3.2
LHMCC may terminate diis Agreement as of
of any year
during die Term, with or without Cause (defined below), upon written notice to Anderson no later
tiian
of dial year (that is, if LHMCC desires to terminate diis Agreement as of
, 2009, dien notice must be given to Anderson by
, 2009).
4.

Compensation and Expenses.

4.1
LHMCC shall pay to Anderson, as compensation in exchange for die '
satisfactory perfonnance by Anderson of all of his duties and obligations hereunder, the following
gross salary, less any deductions or offsets permitted hereunder, and 'any deductions tiiat federal
state and local taring autiiorities require LHMCC to widihold:

Period of Service

Compensation

11/26/07 to J _ J 0 8

$80,000

_701/08 to _7_709

$88,000

_V01/09 to J_J10

$96,800

_V01/10 to J_l\ 1 (LHMCC
option)

$106,480
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/Ol/ll to J_JVt

(LHMCC
option)

$117,128

4.2
Anderson's annual compensation shall he payable in semi-mondily
installments on die fifteenth and last day of each month, with die first installment to be paid on die
30* day of November, 2007.
4.3
Anderson shall receive full employee benefits, including medical insurance
and 401 (k), commensurate with those benefits offered to other similarly situated full time
employees of LHMCC from time to time.
4.4
Anderson shall he eligible to receive paid vacation benefits after die first six
(6) mondis of die Term, in compliance with LHMCC's vacation policy in force from time to time
for similarly situated employees.
•
-5.
Performance. Anderson shall devote his full time, attention and energy to die
performance of his sendees hereunder, except as odierwise stated herein. Anderson shall perform
die same conscientiously and to die full limit of his- ability at all times. He shall promptiy and
faidifully comply with all die reasonable instructions, directions, requests, rules and regulations of
LHMCC iii connection tiierewitii.
6.
Conduct Anderson shall not during die Term hereof act in a manner tending to
be offensive to decency, morality or social propriety, or tending to result in scandal, ridicule or
contempt, or tending lo provoke any retaliatory action or boycott against ltimself or LHMCC. Any
waiver of any provision of tins paragraph shall not be deemed a continuing waiver.
7.

Ownership of literary and Reproduction Rights.

7.1
In addition to Anderson's sendees, LHMCC shall b e entitled to, and shall
own, solely and exclusively, all literary and reproduction rights thereof, and rights of even7 kind
therein arising therefrom, and all rights and proceeds derived therefrom.
7.2
Anderson hereby assigns and transfers to LHMCC all his right, tide and
interest in and to such rights, witiiout reservation, condition or limitation. If LHMCC desires to
secure separate assignments tiiereof, Anderson shall promptly execute and deliver die same to
LHMCC upon request
7.3
Except as odierwise provided herein, Anderson shall not transfer or attempt
to transfer to anyone otiier than LHMCC, any right, tide or interest in or to any of die foregoing
nor shall he at any time make or purport to make any grant to any tiiird party in derogation
tiiereof.
7.4
The provisions of this Section 7 shall remain in fall force and effect
regardless ol" die termination of tiiis Agreement, and regardless of-whedicr such termination occurs
tlirougli expiration or as a result of cancellation by LHMCC.
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8>

Use of Name and likeness. Except as otherwise provided herein, LHMCC shrill

have:
8.1
T h e exclusive right during die Term hereof Lo use Anderson's name, voice
and likeness for advertising and promoting KJZZrTY;
8.2
Agreement; and

T h e non-exclusive right Lo use die same after die termination of diis

8.3
The use hereinabove referred shall not, without Anderson's written
consent, include (lie use or his name, voice or likeness for general commercial purposes, such as
the advertising or promotion of a product or sendee by way of endorsement, or otherwise which is
not associated with or affiliated with LHMCC.
i

9. ' ' Insurance- LHMCC shall have die right to apply, at any time or from time to time,
in its own name or otherwise, and at its own expense, for life, healdi, accident or other insurance
covering Anderson, in order to protect its interest hereunder. Anderson shall assist LHMCC in
procuring such insurance by submitting to the customary medical examination and by signing such
papers as may reasonably be required in connection therewith. Anderson shall have no right,
title
or interest in or to such insurance or die proceeds thereof.
10.

<

Teiminalion.

10 J
Dining die T e r m hereof, LHMCC may, in its sole discretion, with or
widiout Cause, terminate this Agreement, in its entirety.
10.2 In die evenL LHMCC lenninates diis Agreement for Cause, LHMCC shall
be excused from all of its obligations hereunder effective immediately upon die dale of
Lenuinalion, excepl for any accrued amounts earned by or payable Lo Anderson. Cause shall be
defined and limited Lo die following: fraud; misappropriation; embezzlement; Anderson's failure lo
.conduct, himself according to die standards set Forth in Section 6 hereof; rendering inappropriate
or disparaging remarks about LHMCC or its officers, agents, employees or organization; deadi;
physical or mental disability or impairment lasting more dian diirty (30) days, which in die
reasonable opinion of L H M C C materially detracts frcjm Anderson's effectiveness in die
performance of his sendees hereunder; other inability to perform Ins sendees as required
hereunder, which inability lasts more that diirty (30J days; and, breach of diis Agreement- In the
event of such disability or inability, in lieu of tenninating diis Agreement, as herein prowled,
LHMCC shall have die option of suspending its obligations hereunder for die term of such
disability or inability, and extending die T c n n of diis Agreement Tor a like period.
10.3 If Anderson's sendees arc terminated by LHMCC without Cause,
Anderson shall be entitled to die average annual salary that would have been paid Lo Anderson
over die entire remaining Term of diis Agreement, or die remaining unearned salary hereunder,
whichever is less. Any amounts paid to .Anderson alter such termination shall be payable in die
same manner as provided in paragraplis 4.1 and 4.2 hereof. In die event LHMCC terminates
Anderson's sendees, Anderson shall, in good faith, and in order Lo mitigate his damages under diis

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

<

|

Page 4 of 8
Employment A*ji.0J
1/7/2008

(

>on

paragraph, immediately seek other employment LHMCC shall be entitled to a right of offset
against any amounts earned by Anderson from such odier employment As a condition precedent
to LHMCCs obligation to make die payments provided for in this Section 10, Anderson shall
supply LHMCC, upon its request, with any and all information which is reasonably necessary or
appropriate for LHMCC to determine whether it is entitled to such offset LHMCC shall also be
entided to a right ol* offset against all workers* compensation benefits and the proceeds of any
disability or odier insurance provided by LHMCC, paid or payable to Anderson by reason of any
disability.
10.4 Upon the expiration or sooner termination of this Agreement, Anderson
shall have die right to require dial LHMCC assign to liim any individual life and/or disability
• insurance provided by L H M C C for Anderson's benefit, so long as (a) Anderson pays to LHMCC
die cash value, if any, of such policy as of die effective dale of any such assignment and (b) die
terms of any such policy permit such assignment
10.5 For a period of one (1) year following die termination of this Agreement, if
tills Agreement terminates for any reason odier dian LHMCC firing Anderson widiout Cause,
Anderson shall not directly or indirecdy, individually or in concert widi others or as an employee,
partner, joint venturer, member, officer, director or shareholder of any business organization,
financially or odierwise, engage in, become interested in or associate widi any odier individual,
business, endeavor or entity in die State of Utah which competes, could compete or will compete
widi LHMCC in any of its businesses. For die purposes of diis Agreement, an individual, business,
endeavor or entity shall be deemed to be competing if die individual, business, endeavor or entity
engages in a business substantially similar to diat of KJZZ-TV. Specifically, but not by way of
limitation, Anderson may not act as an anchorperson on any program on any television station in
die Salt Lake City Television DMA during such one (1) year period. If LHMCC terminates
Anderson widiout Cause, dien die one "(I) year non-competition restriction set forth above shall
not be effective.
11.
No Obligation to Use Services, Subject to L H M C C s obligation to pay Anderson
die compensation specified herein, LHMCC shall not be obligated to use Anderson's sendees, and
shall not be liable to Anderson in any way for failure to do so in whole or in part
12.

Equitable Relief.

12.1 ' Anderson acknowledges tiiat die sen-ices he is to render LHMCC are of a
special and extraordinary character dial, gives diem a unique value; diat such services cannot be
replaced; diat die loss of sucli sendees could not be reasonably or adequately compensated by
damages in an action at law; and diat a breach by him of any provision hereof would cause
LHMCC immediate and irreparable injury. Accordingly, LHMCC shall have die right: to obtain
from any court or arbitrator having jurisdiction, widiout die necessity of posting bond, such
equitable relief as may be appropriate, including a decree enjoining Anderson from any such
furdier breach hereof.
12.2 Resort by LHMCC to such relief shall not be construed as a waiver by it of
any odier right it might have for damages or odierwise.
Page 5 of 8
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12.3 If Anderson at any time indicates to LHMCC dial he does not intend to
perform his obligations hereunder, such indication shall constitute a breach diereof on Ms part
12.4 L H M C C s rights and remedies by reason of Anderson's breach of his
obligations hereunder shall be cumulative; and die exercise of any one or more of diem shall not
be exclusive of any odier or odiers LHMCC might have under diis Agreement or by law.
13.

Confidentiality.

13.1 Neither party shall disclose the terms of diis Agreement; including but not
limited to die consideration to be given by die parties hereunder, to any diird parts' at any time,
except only dial Anderson may disclose die terms of diis Agreement and provide a copy diereof to
any current or prospective employers (subject to all die terms hereof) who reasonably request that
Anderson do so, and that eidier party may disclose die terms of diis Agreement to such tax and
legal advisors as are necessary for die respective parlies to properly comply with all existing laws.
13.2 Further, Anderson acknowledges that during his employment he will
acquire knowledge of confidential information regarding die business and operations of LHMCC.
Accordingly, Anderson shall not, widiout the written consent of LHMCC, directiy or indirecdy,
during die Term or at any time thereafter, disclose to anyone or use in any manner any such
confidential information, odier dian in connection widi Anderson's sendees hereunder.
Confidential information shall include infomiation which has been or may be communicated
orally, in writing, or in any odier recorded or tangible form and information which may have come
to die attention of Anderson before or after die dale of diis Agreement; and data and information
shall be considered confidential infomiation if, due to its character, nature or die manner in which
it is conveyed, a reasonable person in alike position and under like circumstances as Anderson
would treat it as secret or confidential. The provisions of diis paragraph 13.2 shall not apply to
data and infomiation that Anderson can prove has become publicly available widiout breach of
confidence by Anderson or any odier person. If, through no fault of his own, Anderson is
required to disclose any confidential information pursuant to any legal requirement or court order,
he shall immediately notify LHMCC and shall cooperate widi LHMCC in seeking to maintain die
confidentiality of that confidential information (e.g., by placing it under seal) or in selling aside, the
requirement or order compelling disclosure.
13.3
Anderson's covenants under diis Section 13 shall apply regardless of die
reason for die termination of his employment Anderson acknowledges that die remedy at law for
breach of die provisions of diis Section 13 will be inadequate and tiiat, in addition to an}' odier
remedy LHMCC may have, LHMCC shall be entided to an injunction restraining any breach or
direatened breach, widiout any bond or odier security being required and widiout die necessity of
proving actual damages.
14.
Right to Contract, The parlies hereto represent and warrant to cadi odier tiiat diey
have die full right and power to enter into diis Agreement; dial except as setfordi herein each does
not now have, nor will at any time hereafter enter into, any contract or commitment widi any diird
party tiiat will prevent or interfere witii die full and complete performance of tiieir obligations
Page 6 of 8
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hereunder, or with die full exercise and enjoyment by die parties of dieir rights hereunder.
15.
Notices. All notices hereunder shall be in writing, and shall be served personally or
by certified mail, return receipt requested, duly addressed to die parties at dieir respective
addresses as set forth under dieir signatures at die end of this Agreement If served personally,
such notice shall be effective upon receipt, and if served by mail, such notice shall be effective two
(2) days after posting. Either party may specify a different address for die purposes hereof by
notice given to die otiier in die same manner.
16.
Clause Headings. The headings of the clauses of this Agreement are solely for die
purpose of convenience. They are not a part hereof, and shall not be used in die construction of
any provision.
17.
Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed under and in
accordance with die laws of die State of Utah.
18.
Waiver. No waiver of any of die provisions of this Agreement shall be deemed, or
shall constitute, a waiver of any other .provision, whether or not similar, nor shall any waiver
constitute a continuing waiver. No waiver shall be binding unless executed in writing by die party
making die waiver.
19.
Modification. This Agreement may not be changed or modified except by an
agreement in writing signed by die party against whom enforcement of die cliange or modification
is asserted.
20.
Assignment Etc. This Agreement shall not be assigned by Anderson. This
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to die benefit of Anderson and LHMCC, and their
assigns and successors in interest.
21.
Agreement Complete. This Agreement consdtutes die entire understanding
between die parlies widi respect to die subject matter hereof.
22.
Construction. In die event any part of this Agreement is found to be void, die
remaining provisions hereof shall, nevertlielcss, be binding widi die same effect as tiiough die void
part were deleted.
23.
Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each
of which shall be deemed an original and all such counterparts shall together constitute one and
die same instrument.
24.
Odier Documents and Acts. Each party shall, at die request of die odier, execute,
acknowledge and deliver whatever additional instruments, and do such oilier acts, as may be
required or convenient in order to accomplish and carry forward die intent and purposes of diis
Agreement,
25.

Attorney Fees. If any claim, arbitration or legal action or otiier proceeding is
Page 7 of 8
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brought for the interpretation or enforcement of this Agreement, or because of an alleged dispute
breach, default or misrepresentation in connection with any of the provisions of the Agreement,
die successful or prevailing party shall be enlided to recover actual attorney fees (whedier or not
die legal services are rendered by a salaried employee of die party), expert witness fees and odier
costs and expenses incurred in die enforcement of this Agreement, whedier by filing suit or not,
but not die cosLs of dieir appointed arbitrator, in addition to any other relief to which dial party
may be enlided.
LARRY H. MILLER COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation dba
KJZZ-TV

By
Printed Name
Its

.

Address:

:

_—
STEVE ANDERSON
Address:

301 West Soudi Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2000 WL 1434170 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.)
(Cite as: 2000 WL 1434170 (Ohio App. 1 Dist.))

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR
REPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF
LEGAL AUTHORITY.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, First District, Hamilton
County.
Julie ROLSEN, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
LAZARUS, INC., Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Nos. C-990588, C-990627.

two assignments of error that the trial court erred
by granting Lazarus directed verdicts on the defamation and contract claims and by reducing the damage award. Lazarus, in its cross-appeal, asserts that
the trial court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict, for a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, and for a new trial on the promissory-estoppel claim. For the reasons that follow, we find no
merit in Rolsen's first assignment of error and consider her second assignment moot. However, we
find merit in Lazarus's assignment of error in its
cross-appeal and, therefore, reverse the judgment of
the trial court on the promissory-estoppel claim.

FACTS
Sept. 29, 2000.
Civil Appeal From Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Judgment Appealed from is Affirmed in
Part, Reversed in Part, and Final Judgment Entered.
David Torchia and Tobias, Kraus & Torchia, for
plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee.
Deborah Adams and Frost & Jacobs, and Robert P.
Joy, Morgan and Brown & Joy, for defendant-appellee/cross-appellant.

OPINION
GORMAN.
*1 Julie Rolsen was terminated from her job with
Lazarus, Inc., as Clinique Counter Manager, after
being accused of stealing a watch from the watch
department. Rolsen subsequently brought claims of
promissory estoppel, defamation, and breach of implied contract against the company. A jury awarded
her $53,400 on her promissory-estoppel claim. The
trial court, however, granted a remittitur, reducing
the judgment to $17,833. Lazarus received directed
verdicts on the contract and defamation claims.

Rolsen's firing occurred on October 10, 1996, a day
on which she forgot to wear her watch to work at a
Dayton Lazarus store. Rolsen testified that, on that
day, there was a special promotional event, and
consequently she had a special need for a watch,
because makeover appointments were scheduled all
day and part of her duties was monitoring the consultants performing the makeovers. In order to have
a watch to wear, she admittedly took a watch from
the display counter in the watch department, removed the tag from the watch, placed the tag behind the keyboard on the cash register so it would
not get lost, and then slipped the watch around her
wrist. She testified that she had seen other store employees similarly borrowing merchandise, such as
sweaters when they were cold, reading glasses
when they could not read tags, and barrettes when
they were required to wear their hair back. She
could not say, however, whether those other borrowings by employees were done with permission
or otherwise condoned by store management.
Rolsen did not advise the watch-department sales
associate of her actions. When asked why she had
not, she explained that, in her view, the watchdepartment sales associate was too far distant and
out of earshot. However, when she returned to the

Both parties have appealed. Rolsen asserts in her

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Clinique counter, Rolsen showed the watch to Mary
Lynn Meier, a Clinique account coordinator who
described herself as the "equivalent to a department
manager of the store." Rolsen testified that she considered Meier her "boss" as well as her supervisor;
Meier testified that Rolsen was her "subordinate."
According to Meier, Rolsen came over to her, told
her that she had left her watch at home, and then
said words to the effect, "Look at this watch I have
borrowed." Meier testified that Rolsen did not,
however, tell her that she had taken the watch from
the watch display counter, that she had taken the
tag off the watch, or that she had chosen not to inform the watch-counter associate. Asked if she had
said anything to Rolsen about whether her taking
the watch was proper, Meier said, "No," although
Meier did testify that she personally saw nothing
wrong with Rolsen borrowing the watch. According
to Rolsen, she believed that Meier had the authority
to grant her permission to wear the watch, and that,
by saying nothing critical, Meier had tacitly given
her consent to what she had done. Meier testified,
however, that she did not have the authority to give
Rolsen or any other employee permission to take
merchandise off the rack or counter and use it for a
day.

still wearing the watch, Kyne and Hendrickson followed her into the restaurant. When they appeared,
Rolsen testified that she had immediately realized
that the watch was the reason. Rolsen testified, "I
said, £Oh, my God, it's about the watch, isn't it?' I
forgot to take the watch off before I went to lunch. I
realized at that point that Joyce probably had not
been briefed on what was happening, otherwise, she
would not have been there."
Rolsen testified that Kyne had asked her to accompany her back to her office to discuss the matter.
She stated that both Kyne and Hendrickson had
"escorted me through the mall into the Lazarus
store." A ccording to Rolsen, her colleagues stared
at the trio as they progressed through the store,
since both Kyne and Hendrickson were known to
other employees as being in charge of security.
When they arrived at Kyne's office, Rolsen explained to Kyne the circumstances surrounding her
wearing the watch and said that Meier could corroborate her story. Bob Monroe, the Human Resources Manager, was called into the office, and
Rolsen repeated her story. According to Rolsen,
both Kyne and Monroe refused her request that they
speak to Meier to verify her story, each telling her
that the incident did not concern Meier. Rolsen was
told that if she had wished to make use of the watch
for a day, she should have purchased it in the morning and returned it for a refund at the end of her shift.

*2 Rolsen and Meier both testified that Rolsen had
asked Meier and another counter employee to remind her to take the watch off and return it before
the end of the day. Rolsen and Meier then worked
the counter until noon, at which point they left the
store to have lunch together at a mall restaurant,
Ruby Tuesdays.

Monroe then left the office to call corporate
headquarters in Atlanta, and while he was awaiting
a return call, he advised Rolsen that she was immediately suspended and would have to leave the
store. Monroe and Hendrickson then walked Rolsen
out of the store, dispatching someone else to get her
belongings. Later that evening, Monroe called
Rolsen at home to tell her that she had been fired
due to the severity of the offense. She then went
back to the store that same evening to get her remaining personal belongings. While doing so, she
was kept under surveillance by security personnel.
She described the scene at the Clinique counter as

While eating, the two women were interrupted by
the security manager of the Lazarus store, Joyce
Kyne, and a Lazarus security detective, Joe
Hendrickson. Hendrickson had observed Rolsen
taking the watch from the watch department-her actions were videotaped by surveillance cameras-and,
believing that he had witnessed a theft, had reported the matter to Kyne. Kyne had instructed
Hendrickson to put Rolsen under surveillance. Because Rolsen had left the store to go to lunch while

to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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emotional, with both her and her colleagues crying
over her firing.

which he or she has a qualified privilege, no matter
how misguided, cannot be said to be acting with actual malice. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated,

DEFAMATION

In order to establish "reckless disregard," the
plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to permit
a finding that the defendant had serious doubts as to
the truth of his publication. Thus, the failure to investigate before publishing will not defeat a qualified privilege, unless the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements or the
veracity or accuracy of his sources.

In her first assignment of error, Rolsen argues that
the trial court erred by granting Lazarus's motion
for a directed verdict on her defamation claim. She
contends that there was evidence of record upon
which a reasonable person could conclude that Lazarus had defamed her by (1) announcing to her colleagues that she had been fired for theft, (2) having
security personnel escort her through the store in
front of her colleagues, and (3) making it necessary
to indicate to prospective employers that she had
been dismissed for theft.
*3 As this court has previously noted, when an act
of alleged defamation has occurred in a business or
professional context by someone whose job gives to
them a legitimate interest in the matter, it is subject
to a qualified privilege. The result is that the
plaintiff must prove not only that the representations were untrue, but that they were made with actual malice. See Contadino v. Blow (1990), 68
Ohio App.3d 463, 469-470, 589 N.E.2d 48, 52. A
showing of actual malice requires evidence that the
alleged perpetrator, acting out of spite or ill will,
made the representations either with knowledge
that they were false, see Hahn v. Kotten (1975), 43
Ohio St.2d 237, 331 N.E.2d 713, or with reckless
disregard for the truth. See New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan (1976), 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710.
To demonstrate a reckless disregard for the truth,
the plaintiff must present clear and convincing
evidence that the untrue statements were made as a
result of the defendant's failure to act reasonably to
discover the truth. See Lairsdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 176, 180,
512 N.E.2d 979, 984. However, in order for the defendant to fail to act reasonably in such a situation,
he or she must first possess some degree of subjective doubt concerning the statements. A person
speaking with moral certainty about a subject with

A & B-Abell v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 1, 12-13,
651 N.E.2d 1283, 1293-1294, citing St Amant v.
Thompson (1968), 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, and
Dale v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emp. Assn. (1991), 57 Ohio
St.3dll2,567N.E.2d253.
Examples of "reckless disregard" are situations in
which the defendant fabricated the story, relies on
his or her imagination, or based the statements on
unverified, anonymous sources. See id. Because
mere negligence is not enough to establish actual
malice, the test for determining whether the defendant entertained "serious doubt" is not an objective
one-/.e., whether a reasonable person should have
questioned the truth of his or her statements.
Rather, the test is a subjective one, requiring the
plaintiff to produce clear and convincing evidence
that the defendant "in fact" entertained serious
doubts about the truth of his statements or the sincerity or accuracy of his sources. See id.
The trial court's decision to grant Lazarus a directed
verdict on the defamation claim presents this question of law: whether, construing the evidence most
strongly in favor of Rolsen, reasonable jurors could
have come to but one conclusion, that being that
she was not defamed. See Strother v. Hutchinson
(1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 423 N.E.2d 467.
*4 Having reviewed the record, we hold that Rolsen
did not present any evidence upon which a reasonable person could have concluded that any of the

© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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Lazarus employees involved in her firing acted with
actual malice. There is no evidence that any of the
principals thought her innocent of what, in their
view, constituted a form of in-store theft. Nor is
there any evidence that they subjectively entertained "serious doubts" about whether what she did
was impermissible under company rules. Rather,
the evidence demonstrates that Kyne, Monroe, and
Hendrickson were absolutely convinced that
Rolsen's actions constituted a theft of the watch,
even if they accepted her explanation. In the company's view, there was simply no authority upon
which she could have borrowed the watch in such a
manner without first paying for it. Thus, the fact
that no one spoke to Meier to corroborate Rolsen's
story is immaterial, since, in the view of her accusers, Meier was without authority to sanction
what Rolsen had done.
Rolsen additionally argues that her physical treatment-for example, being led through the store by
security-constituted a form of defamation by conduct under our decision in Uebelacker v. Cincom
Systems, Inc. (1988), 80 Ohio App.3d 97, 608
N.E.2d 858. We disagree. The actions of the Lazarus employees here simply do not compare to the
extreme, outrageous conduct of the company's employees in Uebelacker. Nor do we find persuasive
Rolsen's argument that she was defamed by her
own republication of the reason for her firing in applying for subsequent positions.
In sum, although the jury may have been given sufficient evidence to have wished that Lazarus had
treated Rolsen more leniently and open-mindedly in
light of the obvious mitigating factors involved,
there was simply no evidence by which the jury
could have clearly and convincingly found that the
company's employees either spread deliberate falsehoods about Rolsen or possessed serious doubts
that her borrowing of the watch constituted in-store
theft. Thus, we affirm the trial court's decision to
grant the company a directed verdict on the defamation claim.

©2010 Thomson Reuters. No

IMPLIED CONTRACT
Rolsen argues that the trial court erred by granting
Lazarus a directed verdict on her claim that her firing violated an implied contract limiting the company's right to fire her at will. She bases this argument on three grounds: (1) that Lazarus had a practice of terminating employees only for just cause;
(2) that Lazarus had a practice and policy of progressive discipline; and (3) that Meier's acquiescence in her borrowing of the watch constituted an
implied promise that she would not be fired for doing so.
According to the express terms of her employment
with Lazarus, Rolsen's employment was at will. An
at-will employment may generally be terminated at
any time by either party, for no reason or for any
reason. See Wright v. Honda America Mfg., Inc.
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 571, 653 N.E.2d 381. Concededly, the at-will status of an employee may be
modified by a subsequent express or implied contract altering the at-will relationship. See Mers v.
Dispatch Printing Co. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 100,
483 N.E.2d 150, paragraph two of the syllabus.
However, here the terms of Rolsen's employment
expressly disclaimed that any company employee
below the rank of Senior Vice President of Human
Resources could alter her at-will status. Her employment application with the company spelled this
out unequivocally, stating,
*5 I agree to conform to the rules and regulations of
the Company, and if employed, I understand and
agree that my employment is at-will and no employment contract rights have been created. I also
understand and agree that my employment may be
terminated at any time with or without cause, and
with or without advance notice at the option of
either the Company or myself. / also understand
that no supervisor, manager or other representative
of the company has any authority to enter into any
express or implied contract for employment for any
specific period of time. Any agreement contrary to
the above must be in writing and must expressly
state that it is a contract and be signed by the Seni-
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that Meier intended to make such a promise. As we
have held before, simply because an employee
chooses to subjectively believe that he or she is
something more than an at-will employee, that does
not create an implied contract. An implied contract
requires more than just an inference by one of the
parties; there must be a meeting of the minds and
mutual assent. See Weiper, supra; Reasoner v. Bill
Woeste Chevrolet, Inc. (1999), 134 Ohio App.3d
196,730,730N.E.2d992,995.

or Vice President, Human Resources.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Given the express terms of Rolsen's employment,
plainly stating that she was an at-will employee
subject to termination "with or without cause" unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the Senior
Vice President in charge of Human Resources, her
arguments in favor of an implied contract are unpersuasive. See Hall v. The Jewish Hosp. of Cincinnati (June 2, 2000), Hamilton App. No. C-990571,
unreported. Although several Lazarus employees
testified that the company "d[id] not take personnel
actions without good reason," this fact alone could
not alter the express terms of Rolsen's employment.
Every company, presumably, does not take personnel actions without good reason. Simply because a
company does not fire its at-will employees arbitrarily does not mean that it has assented to a modification of their at-will status. If such were the case,
a company would have to either espouse a policy or
engage in a practice of random firings in order to
avoid such a modification.

*6 We hold, therefore, that there was no evidence
of record from which a reasonable person could
conclude that Lazarus had entered into an implied
contract altering Rolsen's at-will employment status.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND REMITTITUR
In her second assignment of error, Rolsen argues
that the trial court erred by reducing the damages
the jury awarded On her promissory-estoppel claim.
In its sole assignment of error in its cross-appeal,
Lazarus argues that the trial court erred in denying
its motions for a directed verdict, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial on the same
claim. Since it attacks the judgment itself, we address Lazarus's assignment first.

Rolsen's argument that Lazarus had a practice of
progressive discipline, and that such a practice was
not followed here, is similarly unpersuasive. The
policy to which she refers appears in the employee
handbook. The handbook, however, expressly disclaims that it creates any contractual rights. In fact,
Rolsen was required to sign the following statement
contained in the handbook: "I understand that nothing in this handbook is to be construed as a direct,
implied or inferred contract of employment."

In addition to an implied contract, a second exception applies to the at-will doctrine: promissory estoppel. See Mers, supra, paragraph three of the syllabus. In order for this exception to apply, however,
there must be a clear, unambiguous promise of employment by the employer, and the employee must
reasonably rely on that promise. See Mers, sup ra,
paragraph three of the syllabus; Weiper, supra;
Reasoner, supra. The test is "whether the employer
should have reasonably expected its representation
to be relied upon by the employee, and if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was detrimental to the employee ." Mers,
supra, paragraph three of the syllabus.

Finally, we reject Rolsen's argument that Meier's
acquiescence in her borrowing of the watch constituted a promise that she would not be fired for doing so. According to the express terms of her employment, only the Senior Vice President in charge
of Human Resources could alter the at-will nature
of her employment in writing. Therefore, even if
Meier had intended to make such a promise, she
had no authority to do so. Second, as Lazarus correctly points out, there is no evidence to suggest

The basis of Rolsen's promissory-estoppel claim
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was that Meier's acquiescence in her borrowing of
the watch constituted a promise, expressed in words
and conduct, that "she would not be fired for using
the watch." According to Rolsen, when she approached Meier and advised her of her plan to use
the watch, "it was incumbent on Meier, if such conduct was improper, to stop it or to make Plaintiff
aware of the consequences." Meier's failure to do
so, she contends, made it reasonable for her to believe that Meier had given her authorization to use
the watch, accompanied by a promise that she
would not be fired for doing so.
The fallacy of this argument is several-fold. First,
according to the express terms of her employment,
only the Senior Vice President in charge of Human
Resources could alter the terms of Rolsen's at-will
employment. In fact, the express terms specifically
stated that a manager-level employee did not have
the authority to enter into a contract for extended
employment. Thus, even if we assume that Meier
had made a promise of continued employment,
Rolsen's reliance upon it would not have been reasonable, since she was expected to have read and understood the language in her employment application. Second, Meier's words and actions, as nebulous as they were, fell far short of a clear, unambiguous promise of continued employment. Meier
testified that she did not say anything to Rolson
concerning the propriety of Rolsen taking the
watch, commenting only upon its appearance-that
she considered it unattractive. Although she testified that she did not personally feel that borrowing
the watch was wrong, Meier did not convey any
sort of promise to Rolsen that she was immune
from punishment should she get caught by other
company personnel ranked above her. Indeed, Meier could not have made such a promise since, as she
testified, she knew she did not have the authority to
grant employees leave to take merchandise for thenown personal use.
*7 We hold, therefore, that, as a matter of law, Meier's words and conduct did not constitute a clear
and unambiguous promise of continued employ-

ment. Her silence and failure to protest could have
been construed in any number of ways, such as a
personal willingness to allow Rolsen to wear the
watch at her own risk. To hold otherwise would
create a rule that passive acceptance by a lowerechelon store manager of a rules infraction that he
or she has no authority to condone creates a binding
promise on the company that no disciplinary action
will be taken. Such a result is completely unsupported by law.
We thus find merit in Lazarus's assignment in its
cross-appeal. Even construing the evidence most
strongly in favor of Rolsen, reasonable minds could
not have concluded that Meier had made a clear and
unambiguous promise of continued employment, or
that Rolsen's reliance on such a promise, even if
made, was reasonable. We hold, therefore, that the
trial court erred in denying Lazarus's motion for a
directed verdict on Rolsen's promissory-estoppel
claim. Consequently, Rolsen's second assignment
of error, in which she argues that the trial court
erred in reducing the damage award on this claim,
is rendered moot.
In sum, we sustain Lazarus's sole assignment of error, overrule Rolsen's first assignment of error, and
deem Rolsen's second assignment to be moot upon
our validation of Lazarus's assignment of error.
Thus, we affirm the judgment entered below to the
extent that it granted directed verdicts to Lazarus on
Rolsen's contract and defamation claims. However,
upon our determination that the trial court erred in
denying a directed verdict for Lazarus on Rolsen's
promissory-estoppel claim, we reverse that portion
of the judgment awarding Rolsen damages on her
promissory-estoppel claim and enter judgment for
Lazarus on that claim.
Judgment accordingly.
SUNDERMANN, J., concurs.
HILDEBRANDT,
P.J., concurs
separately.
HELDEBRANDT, P.J., concurring separately.
Before addressing Rolsen's employment claims, I
would like to clarify my understanding of the
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"actual malice" standard in defamation cases. The
actual malice required for liability in defamation
cases is different from the type of malice required
to prove entitlement to punitive damages in other
types of cases and has nothing to do with spite or ill
will. In the context of a defamation claim, a person
acts with actual malice when the person acts with
"knowledge that the statements are false or with
reckless disregard of whether they are false or not."
mi
W hile spite or ill will might provide evidence
of a defendant's reckless disregard for the truth of a
statement, a plaintiff is not required to show the existence of spite or ill will to defeat a claim of privilege. In this case, Rolsen presented no evidence
either that Lazarus either knew that the statements
were not true or that it acted recklessly in that regard. I agree with the majority's disposition of that
issue.
FN1. See Hahn v. Rotten (1975), 43 Ohio
St.2d 237, 331 N.E.2d 713, paragraph two
of the syllabus; Jacobs v. Frank (1991), 60
Ohio St.3d 111, 573 N.K2d 609, paragraph
two of the syllabus; A & B-Abell Elevator
Co. v. Columbus /Central Ohio Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council (1995), 73 Ohio
St.3d 1, 651 N.E.2d 1283; see, also, Gureasko v. Bethesda Hosp. (1996), 116 Ohio
App.3d724,689N.E.2d76.
*8 Turning to the employment-law issues, I write
separately to emphasize my belief that the existence
of a disclaimer in a handbook will not always defeat an implied-contract claim based on conduct or
representations outside of the handbook.
In Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that "[a]bsent fraud in the
inducement, a disclaimer in an employee handbook
stating that employment is at will precludes an employment contract other than at will based upon the
terms of the employee handbook " FN2 In Atkinson
v. International Technegroup, Inc.,™ the employment manual stated specifically that employment
was at will. However, managers from the company
testified that the company had a policy to treat em-

ployees fairly and not to discharge employees except for a good reason. The managers practiced this
policy, and the employee was aware of its application in specific circumstances. In Atkinson, this
court upheld the jury verdict in the plaintiffs favor
on his implied-contract claims despite the disclaimer.
FN2. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570
N.E.2d 1095, paragraph one of the syllabus
(emphasis added).
FN3. (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 349, 666
N.E.2d 257.
Thus, even if a handbook contains a disclaimer, the
disclaimer will preclude only those contract claims
based on the terms of the handbook and will not
preclude a claim of implied contract based on the
course of dealing between the parties or other facts
and circumstances reflecting the implicit and explicit terms of an employee's employment. In this
case, apart from the handbook, Rolsn only presented the statements of a few employees that Lazarus
did not make personnel decisions without good
reason. Her evidence fell far short of demonstrating
the type of policy that existed in Atkinson despite
the disclaimer in the handbook. Her evidence
failed, as a matter of law, to show that fair treatment and just-cause discharge were implied conditions of her employment.
Likewise, a disclaimer in an application or a handbook should not preclude a plaintiff from establishing a claim of promissory estoppel in an appropriate case. The basis of a claim for promissory estoppel is detrimental reliance. The elements are distinct from those of a contract claim. The court
stated in Wing that the existence of a disclaimer in a
handbook precludes a contract claim "based upon
the terms of the employee handbook. " FN4 I do not
believe that the disclaimer should be extended to
preclude non-contract claims based on conduct or
representations made outside of the handbook.™5
FN4. (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 570
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Please Note:

FN5. See Randleman v. Dick Masheter
Ford, Inc. (Aug. 22, 1991), Franklin App.
No. 91AP-201, unreported, (disclaimer in
application bars claim of implied contract
based on application, but not claim of estoppel based on other promises).

The court has placed of record its own entry in this
case on the date of the release of this Opinion.

In this case, the only promise on which Rolsen allegedly relied was the silence of the manager when
Rolsen showed her the watch that she was wearing.
Her evidence was insufficient, as a matter of law, to
demonstrate the type of reasonably specific promise
or statement that is required for an estoppel claim. I
do not think that we need to reach the question of
whether her reliance was reasonable. However,
since the majority has addressed this issue, I am
concurring separately to state my disagreement
with the proposition that Rolsen's reliance was, as a
matter of law, unreasonable because of the disclaimers in the Lazarus handbooks.

Ohio App. 1 Dist.,2000.
Rolsen v. Lazarus, Inc.
Not Reported in N.E.2d, 2000 WL 1434170 (Ohio
App. 1 Dist.)
END OF DOCUMENT

*9 Finally, I disagree with the statement of the majority that "every company, presumably, does not
take personnel actions without good reason." With
the numerous decisions in this state alone upholding jury or bench awards on discrimination claims,
the existence of employers like the one in Wing
who terminate employees who call attention to their
employer's illegal acts, and the policy in this state
of upholding the right of an employer to terminate
an employee for any reason or no reason, I cannot
agree that "every employer" makes personnel decisions for good reasons. The presumption used in
employment cases like this one is not that the employer discharged the employee for a good reason,
but that the reason, whether good or bad, is irrelevant to the lawfulness of the decision. Even if the
employer in this case had a good reason to terminate Rolsen's employment, the majority's statement
is far too broad.
For the foregoing reasons, I separately concur in
this case.
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Michigan.
Chad WATERMAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
GREEKTOWN CASINO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 244213.
April 13, 2004.
Before: WILDER, P.J., and HOEKSTRA
KELLY, JJ.

and

[UNPUBLISHED]
PER CURIAM.
*1 In this employment case arising out of plaintiffs
claims of wrongful termination, defendant was
granted leave to appeal the order denying defendant
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We
reverse.
Defendant first argued on appeal that the trial court
erred in denying summary disposition to defendant
because this Court has held that when a handbook
contains conflicting language, but also contains a
contractual disclaimer, an employee cannot, as a
matter of law, reasonably and legitimately expect
that a just-cause contract has been created. We agree.
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition brought under MCR
2.116(C)(10). UAW-GM Human Resources Center
v KSL Recreation Corp, 228 Mich.App 486, 490;
579 NW2d 411 (1998). Under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
a party may move for dismissal of all or part of a
claim based on the assertion that there is no genu-

ine issue with respect to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law. Universal Underwriters
Group v. Allstate Ins Co, 246 MichApp 713, 720;
635 NW2d 52 (2001). When reviewing the motion,
the court must consider the affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and other documentary
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
"At will" is the presumed employment relationship
in Michigan. Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich.
684, 687; 273 NW 315 (1937). However, a justcause employment relationship can be found "as a
result of an employee's legitimate expectations
grounded in an employer's policy statements."
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,
408 Mich. 579, 598; 292 NW2d 880 (1980). The
proper inquiry is whether the employer, through its
employment manual or otherwise, made representations or promises that termination would be only
for just cause. Biggs v. Hilton Hotel Corp, 194
MichApp 239, 241; 486 NW2d 61 (1992).
Plaintiff argued that conflicting provisions in defendant's handbook created ambiguity regarding his
employment status. To support this contention,
plaintiff relied on this Court's decision in Dalton v.
Herbruck Egg Sales Corp, 164 Mich.App 543, 547;
417 NW2d 496 (1987), where this Court found that
when an employee handbook contains language
providing for both just-cause and at-will termination, the question whether a just-cause contract has
been formed is a question of fact for a jury.
However, the controlling case in these circumstances is our Supreme Court's decision, Lytle v.
Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich. 153, 162; 579
NW2d 906 (1998), where the employee manual at
issue contained both at-will and just-cause employment language, and it also contained language stating that it was not intended to create any contractual obligations. The Court held that the plaintiff
could not assert a legitimate expectation of just-
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cause employment based on the employer's policy
to terminate only for cause where the handbook
specifically disclaimed any intent to create contractual or binding obligations to employees. Id. at 157,
170-171.
*2 Moreover, although not specifically overruling
Dalton, the Lytle Court expressly rejected the suggestion that it create a new rule that would apply
whenever a handbook contained conflicting policies
and found instead that a legitimate-expectation
claim does not automatically arise whenever a
handbook contains mixed messages. Id. at 170 n.
16. "[T]he plaintiff must still provide sufficient
evidence to raise a triable question that the policy
arguably instilled a legitimate expectation that superseded the express contractual disclaimer." Id.

him. Thus, consistent with our Supreme Court's
holding in Lytle, supra at 157, 170-171, we find
that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for summary disposition because plaintiff
could not as a matter of law have had a legitimate
expectation of just-cause employment.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in
denying summary disposition to defendant because
plaintiff has not offered any evidence to suggest
that he either discussed or entered into a just-cause
employment contract with defendant or it agents.
We agree.
In addition to legitimate expectations based on an
employer's policy statements, a just-cause employment relationship can be found "by express agreement, oral or written." Toussaint, supra at 598. Accordingly, plaintiff argued that Greektown's chief
operating officer (COO) admitted that Greektown
employees have a just-cause employment relationship.

Additionally, we reject plaintiffs argument that
Lytle is distinguishable because Lytle was based on
claims of discrimination and the manual at issue in
that case contained the words "proper cause" instead of "just cause." With regard to the claims
presented, although the plaintiff in Lytle, sup ra at
157, did allege age and gender discrimination, it
was a distinct claim from the plaintiffs breach of
contract claims. Regarding the terminology of
"proper" versus "just," we disagree that there is any
difference between proper cause and just cause in
this context. See Scholz v. Montgomery Ward &
Co, Inc, 437 Mich. 83, 107; 468 NW2d 845 (1991).
Regardless which adjective is used, the meaning is
the same-there is a contractual limitation on the employer's right to terminate employment, and the employer cannot fire the employee without some sort
of reasonable justification or cause. See Lytle,
supra at 164.

"The starting point in analyzing oral statements for
contractual implications is to determine the meaning that reasonable persons might have attached to
the language, given the circumstances presented."
Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co, 437 Mich. 627,
640; 473 NW2d 268 (1991). The statements must
be "specific statements with regard to duration of
employment or grounds for termination," and show
"indication of an actual negotiation or an intent to
contract for permanent or just-cause employment."
Lytle, supra at 172. Further, oral statements of job
security must be clear and unequivocal to overcome
the presumption of employment at will. Biggs,
supra at 242.

Here, defendant's employee handbook contains a
contractual disclaimer, which clarifies that only the
chief operating officer of the company has the authority to enter into contracts with employees.
Plaintiff confirmed that he read and signed an acknowledgment setting forth a similar disclaimer,
and he stated that he had never met the chief operating officer, let alone entered into a contract with

*3 The COO's statements do not reasonably rise to
the level of clear and unequivocal statements of job
security for two reasons. First, when asked about
the language in the handbook, the COO only confirmed that the handbook stated that there would
have to be a valid business-related reason to terminate an employee. Second, as defendant points out,
both the acknowledgment and the handbook state

©2010 Thomson Reuters.

Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

J. C * w ^

I

\J±

—f

Page 3
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2004 WL 787157 (MicLApp.)
(Cite as: 2004 WL 787157 (Mich.App.))
that only the COO has the authority to enter into
contracts with employees. As discussed, plaintiff
never met the COO, let alone entered into a contract with him. Thus, even if the COO believed that
defendant's employees had just-cause employment
relationships, plaintiff could not have relied on this
belief when plaintiff was not aware of it until after
his cause of action had been initiated and the deposition testimony was taken.

END OF DOCUMENT

Moreover, plaintiff testified that instead of a traditional interview, he had an audition, during which
he demonstrated his dice dealing skills. After the
audition, he was immediately offered a job, but no
one talked to him about the terms and conditions of
employment or reasons for termination at that time,
and the only question he asked was about the rate
of pay. He stated that no one ever told him that he
was an at-will employee, but no one ever told him
that he could only be terminated for cause either.
Thus, by plaintiffs own admission, he never
entered into an actual negotiation or an had any
conversations regarding the intent to contract for
permanent or just-cause employment. See Lytle,
supra at 172. Therefore, we find that the trial court
erred in denying summary disposition to defendant.
Defendant also argued that even if plaintiff had a
just-cause contract, the trial court erred in denying
summary disposition to defendant because it had a
valid, business-related reason to terminate plaintiff
based on its uniformly applied policy to terminate
employees who fail to catch cheaters on numerous
occasions. However, we need not address this issue
in light of our holding that a just-cause contract did
not exist.
Reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition in defendant's favor. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Mich.App.,2004.
Waterman v. Greektown Casino
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2004 WL 787157
(Mich.App.)
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Court of Appeals of Utah.
PRECISION TIME, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
EQUITY PROPERTIES AND DEVELOPMENT
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, an Illinois limited partnership, doing business in Utah as Equity Properties and Development (Illinois) Limited Partnership, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 990982-CA.
Oct. 25, 2001.
Cameron M. Hancock, Paul C. Burke, and Steven
W. Call, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
George A. Hunt and Carolyn S. Jensen, Salt Lake
City, for appellee.
Before JACKSON, ORME, and THORNE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official
Publication)
ORME, Judge.
*1 Whether an oral agreement can be enforceable
when the parties contemplated the execution of a
written agreement is a question of intent. See Doll
v. Grand Union Co., 925 F.2d 1363, 1370 (11th
Cir.1991); Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place Assoc, 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah 1980). "There does
not appear to be any doubt that if the parties make
it clear that they do not intend that there should be

legal consequences unless and until a formal writing is executed, there is no contract until that time."
Engineering Assoc, 622 P.2d at 787. See RJ.
Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 820
(Utah 1952) (explaining that " 'if an intention is
manifested in any way that legal obligations
between the parties shall be deferred until the writing is made, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do not constitute a contract' ") (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 26 cmt. a (1932)).FN1
FN1. For the current version of this precept, see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 cmt. b (1981).
On facts similar to those of the instant case, the
court in Doll concluded that it was "unwilling to allow a jury to infer an agreement to sign a lease
when one of the parties specifically declared its intention not to be bound until a lease was drafted
and signed by both parties." 925 F.2d at 1370. The
court explained that while enforcing a verbal agreement may be justified where the evidence suggests
that this was the intent of the parties, "when the
parties make their intentions [not to be bound absent a formal executed agreement] clear, there is no
basis for a court to step in and contradict their explicit desires." Id. See 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin
on Contracts § 2.9, at 149-50 (revised ed.1993).
In this case, Equity repeatedly made clear its intent
not to be bound until the parties had executed a
formal writing containing all terms of a comprehensive agreement. Equity included language in letters it sent Precision explaining this intention, and
such language also appeared in various draft leases.
In light of these facts, that the parties successfully
negotiated and reached a tentative agreement on a
number of the relevant terms does not justify ignoring appellant's continuously expressed intent not to
be bound other than by a finalized, signed lease. m2
FN2. In Doll, the plaintiffs argued they had
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reached an agreement with the defendant
on all essential terms of a lease. See 925
F.2d at 1368; Corbin § 2.9, at 150 n. 9.
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the
plaintiffs focus on the details agreed upon
"ignored the primary question" and held
that the defendant's intent not to be bound
until a formal written agreement had been
executed was clear and determinative. See
925 F.2d at 1368-70.
Further, even if Precision was free to ignore the expressed intent of Equity, the facts of this case
simply do not indicate that a complete lease agreement was ever reached, even orally. Precision contends that an agreement was reached on April 18,
1995, and fully memorialized in a final draft of the
lease circulated on May 17, 1995. This argument is
untenable given that the parties continued to reject
and alter key terms of their still-evolving agreement
after May 17 and until at least May 31, 1995.™3
Confronted with these facts and Equity's continuous
inclusion of language in the proposed lease agreements and correspondence between the parties indicating that Equity would not be bound until a
formal lease was executed, we conclude that it was
improper to enforce one of the many draft leases as
though it were a binding contract. FN4 T he verdict
and judgment are contrary to law, and they are accordingly reversed.

FN4. Even if a final oral agreement had
been reached, the Statute of Frauds would
likely render it unenforceable. See Utah
Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1995). See also 4
Caroline N. Brown, Corbin on Contracts §
17.7, at 431-34 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., revised ed. 1993).
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Associate Presiding J.,
and WILLIAM A. THORNE, Jr., J, concur.
UtahApp.,2001.
Precision Time, Inc. v. Equity Prop, and Dev. Limited Partnership
Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 1297792 (Utah
App.), 2001 UT App 313
END OF DOCUMENT

FN3. This is a clear indication that neither
party believed they had a binding final
agreement. Not only did Precision acknowledge that it understood a formal written
agreement had to be executed, but it continued, as late as May 2, 1995, to propose
changes to the April 18, 1995 draft lease,
including a request for a $75,000 tenant
construction allowance instead of a
$70,000 allowance. Furthermore, on May
22, 1995, Precision rejected and/or altered
terms of the May 17 draft lease. Following
this date, the parties were never able to
come to an agreement on all terms.
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